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Maori Wellbeing and Being-in-the-World: 
Challenging Notions for Psychological Research and Practice in New Zealand 
 





Psychological research and practice in New Zealand has a long history of a positivist inspired 
epistemology and a pragmatic evidence-based approach to therapeutic treatment. There is a 
growing realization that a more meaningful interface between research and practice is required to 
accommodate indigenous Maori knowledge of wellbeing and living. The dominant Western 
psychological view in New Zealand of world, time, illness and wellbeing results in practices that 
do not make sense in cultural terms. The medicalisation and classification of psychological 
disorders cannot account for the degree to which cultural and spiritual factors are associated 
with problems of living. Heidegger’s analysis of Being and his phenomenological method of 
understanding these matters ontologically reflect a persuasion not dissimilar to the worldview of 
the Maori and their notion of wellbeing. It offers some direction to the question of how to better 




In examining the relationship between psychological 
practice and the basic scientific principles of 
psychology in New Zealand, Evans and Fitzgerald 
(2007) point out that the dominant mode of practice in 
New Zealand has always been behavioural therapy 
and, more recently, cognitive behavioural therapy. 
Psychodynamic theory has not had a strong influence 
in the psychology departments at New Zealand 
universities. According to these authors, psychology 
in New Zealand has been strongly influenced by the 
‘Vail model’ of practice. This model of practice is 
characterized by treatment protocols derived from 
basic laboratory science, commonly known as 
‘evidence based practice’, in which randomized 
controlled trials are used to attest to the value of a 
particular form of treatment, most often cognitive 
behavioural therapy. The behavioural principles of 
classical conditioning, learning theory and operant 
conditioning are tested and validated in controlled 
experiments which result in prescriptive models of 
treatment (manuals). “The Vail model conceptualized 
training as preparing professionals to be good 
consumers of science,” say Evans and Fitzgerald 
(2007, p. 285).  
 
A good example of professionals being good 
consumers of science can be seen in the study by 
Perseius, Öjehagen, Ekdahl, Åsberg, and Samuelsson 
(2003) who set out to determine how dialectical 
behavioural therapy [DBT] is perceived by borderline 
personality disorder patients and their DBT therapists. 
The study concludes that dialectical behavioural 
therapy results in a significant decline in suicidal 
attempts and acts of self-harm. The therapist 
participants attributed the success of the DBT 
approach to the “theoretical underpinnings and the 
therapeutic techniques” and regarded the “personality 
of the therapist [as] of minor importance” (p. 224).  
The therapists also felt that it was critical to stick to 
the therapeutic manual and stated that failures occur 
when therapists “don’t stick to the manual” and work 
“by ‘their own heads’” (p. 224). Here the ‘Vail 
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model’ of professionals being good consumers of 
science in the form of prescriptive manuals of 
treatment is evident. Manuals of treatment, which 
encourage professionals to follow specific treatment 
protocols rather than practice and care according to 
their own experience, observations and appreciation 
of the person present, abound. Manuals of treatment 
for mood disorders, for example, include the eight 
session programme of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy for Depression (Segal, Williams & 
Teasedale, 2002), Mind over Mood: Change How You 
Feel by Changing the Way You Think (Greenberger & 
Padesky, 1995) and Adolescent Volcanoes: Helping 
Adults and Adolescents Handle Anger (Carroll & 
Hancock, 2001), to name but a few. 
 
There are consequences associated with the 
aforementioned model of psychological research and 
practice that have to be borne in mind if the aim is to 
better integrate research and practice, according to 
Evans and Fitzgerald (2007). With an over-reliance 
on formal manuals of treatment, practitioners become 
more like technicians rather than scientist-
practitioners, and Evans and Fitzgerald refer to 
research findings which indicate that highly trained 
practitioners are now no more effective than lesser 
qualified ‘paraprofessionals’. The study by Perseius et 
al. (2003) provides evidence of how practitioners 
come to rely on manuals rather than their own 
experiences and understandings. Practitioners of 
psychology seem to no longer have faith in their 
competence to understand what they learn from their 
first hand experiences. They have ‘learned to forget’ 
that they are sufficiently qualified by virtue of their 
humanness to allow phenomena to account for 
themselves, or ‘speak to them’, without what they 
encounter first having to be formally interpreted for 
them. They refrain from re-searching that which they 
encounter and, instead, reduce what is encountered to 
the ‘tried and tested’ of the (apparently) scientifically 
known. The attitude behind prescriptive therapeutic 
techniques and manuals of treatment is “that we 
cannot trust what meets the eye and the ear … we 
need to devise interpretative means to decipher the 
phenomena” (Cohn, 2002, p. 115). Yet, there is 
nothing else to look for other than what meets the eye 
and the ear; “practice, so to speak, [is the] other side 
of our beliefs” (p. 116). Practice is the enactment of 
belief, and technique becomes necessary when there 
is a gap between belief and enactment. The 
practitioner whose eyes and ears are attuned to 
manuals resorts to the mechanized and dehumanizing 
techniques of therapy so easily recognized in the 
science of prescriptive psychology in practice. Good 
‘consumers of science’ are by definition, then, not 
active agents who formulate new research questions 
according to what they see and hear in consultation. 
As a consequence, research and practice enter into 
conversation about matters that do not matter. 
 
The natural scientific attitude of the ‘Vail model’ is 
not appropriate if one is interested in understanding 
phenomena relevant to being human. The reason for 
this is that scientific investigations are usually 
founded on a philosophy of mind which 
decontextualizes the lived world of Dasein. The 
phenomenon is uprooted from its origins and, from a 
human experiential point of view, becomes detached 
from its referential context of meaning and 
significance. “Scientifically relevant ‘facts’ are not 
merely removed from their context of selective 
seeing; they are theory-laden, i.e., recontextualized in 
a new projection” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 81). This is a 
projection which no longer belongs to Dasein and its 
existence, but now belongs to the existence of 
science. The theory of mind informs an epistemology 
that attends to phenomena in a manner that no longer 
matters for the experiencing person. It is a 
methodology which sets in motion an understanding 
of phenomena that are interpreted as ‘theoretical 
constructs’. These constructs do not do justice to the 
self-understanding and interpretation of the being that 
is human. In this manner, science comes to 
understand itself rather than understand Dasein. 
 
What attitude would do more justice to the self-
understanding of being human? According to Crowe 
(2006), Heidegger’s project is to gain a deeper 
appreciation of life by way of a “phenomenological-
critical destruction”. It is a process that allows one to 
reach “moments of sense” which are concealed by 
contemporary discourse. Contemporary discourse is 
characterised by the ascription of a certain meaning to 
a phenomenon which, with repeated use and 
reference, reduces the phenomenon to something self-
evident. Meaning then becomes part of contemporary 
discourse and gets passed along in “idle talk”: the 
hallmark of inauthenticity. According to Crowe, 
Heidegger’s method of phenomenological critique 
(destruction) aims to get to the “basis of enactment” 
which is “factical life-experience”. One way to do this 
is by tracing commonly used terms back to their 
origins in factical life experience. The aim of 
destruction is twofold: to strip commonly used 
concepts and terms of their veneer of self-evidence, 
and to uncover what is genuine about these 
expressions. Stripping our understanding of its 
common sense meaning brings us closer to the 
genuine “moments of sense” and brings about self-
understanding in going about everyday life. 
 
Here is an example of an attempt to strip the ‘self-
evident’ veneer of understanding from the 
phenomenon of care in a mental health setting. In my 
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research towards understanding how therapists 
experience suicidal people in their care, a participant, 
Marie (a pseudonym), says the following:  
 
Whenever I would see him I would run it by 
one of my colleagues and say “These are 
the buttons I pushed and this is how he 
presented and this is what I had done – 
how does it sound to you?” Then I know I 
have been using my skills and I have done 
what I could [checking for symptoms of 
psychosis and suicidality]. That is all I can 
ask of myself. I feel more confident 
knowing that I have done a proper 
assessment and have looked in all the little 
spaces. Then I would feel more reassured 
about the decisions I have made with him, 
knowing how he was going to manage his 
medication and his life. It means getting 
them into a place where they can function 
at the highest level they can.  And having 
the best quality of life they can. For me 
caring means that I want the best for 
someone, and I’ve put myself out there for 
them and put a package together.  Hoping 
means that they could do this or maybe it 
will happen but not do much about it.  
Hoping is lacking the action.  So caring is 
the action.  Hoping is just wishing but not 
doing much about it.  
 
In discussing how she copes and manages her clients 
who are suicidal, Marie gives a description of what it 
means for her to care for someone. Marie has a very 
clear understanding of what it means to care for a 
client in a mental health service. To care is to ensure 
that the client exhibits no signs or symptoms of 
psychosis or suicidality. She needs to “push the right 
buttons”, which is a mode of caring Marie defines as 
a thorough assessment. There are distinct advantages 
to this mode of caring: (1) It demonstrates that she is 
actively doing something and not “just hoping and 
wishing”. (2) It is a form of care that complies with 
institutionalized expectations and in doing so she 
feels confident and believes in herself as doing all that 
is expected of her. (3) To care is to be able to “put a 
package” together which will “put the person in a 
better place” where he can function better and have a 
better quality of life. ‘Packages of care’ is an example 
of professional idle talk, and it has become a common 
(and an embarrassingly self exposing) expression in 
mental health services in New Zealand to describe 
how we care: our care comes packaged. Packages 
usually consist of a regime of medication which the 
health professional monitors for compliance and 
effect, along with other evidence-based therapeutic 
prescriptions with expectations of compliance 
attached. Packages of care are neat and handy, and 
caring in this manner is explicit and unambiguous for 
all to see and judge. This explicitness removes the 
mystery of caring for a fellow human being, which is 
now a science based on rules and definitions. (4) 
Marie can document her findings of care, which 
would safeguard her from any possible accusations or 
recriminations in future. In caring like this, health 
professionals keep themselves ‘safe’ and at an 
objective distance. (5) This mode of caring is 
perfectly acceptable in mental health settings and, by 
following the institutionalized expectations regarding 
suicidal and psychotic clients, Marie can demonstrate 
that she cares in accordance with the institution’s 
interpretation of care. And that is all that is expected 
of her. 
 
What else can be said about this mode of caring? The 
first thing to take account of is that culture and 
cultural institutions have existence as their way of 
being, just like human beings have (Dreyfus, 1991). 
Secondly, as Heidegger (1927/1962) says, that 
existence is a way of being founded upon self-
understanding. Like human beings, institutions base 
their decisions and actions upon their interpretation of 
phenomena, and I have attempted to show how a 
mental health institution understands what it means to 
care, and how a therapist’s sharing of that way of 
understanding is demonstrated in what she does. 
 
This mode of caring is a deficient mode of care and 
not the kind of caring Heidegger has in mind when he 
talks about the ontological phenomenon of care. Care, 
ontologically speaking, is the fundamental existential 
structure which makes the concern for other Daseins 
possible (Waters, 2005). To say “I care for you” or “I 
care for myself” refers to an attitude, and this is not 
the care Heidegger has in mind. His conception of 
care is that Dasein is care. It distinguishes Dasein as 
being in the world; it is a constitutional mode of 
existing. Care is the foundation of disclosure of world 
and grounds our knowing of the world. Our concern 
for other Daseins is made possible in care. How we 
are concerned is the ontic manifestation of the 
ontological phenomenon of care. The extent to which 
the latter phenomenon is veiled is dependent on our 
motivation and intention in being concerned for 
another. The nature and intention of our concern from 
a therapeutic perspective contributes to the extent to 
which world is disclosed. The way in which we are 
concerned as therapists may therefore either aid 
disclosure or perpetuate concealment of our being in 
the world. In the example given above, the way in 
which the mental health institution and Marie go 
about caring perpetuates a concealment of being in 
the world. It is a deficient mode of caring for another 
being that is human because: (1) It ‘leaps in’ and 
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takes over responsibility instead of ‘leaping ahead’. It 
leaps in with packages of care. This form of care 
narrows the world of the person down. It is a 
distortion of the ontological meaning of care, namely, 
being responsible for understanding oneself, upon 
which understanding one creates an existence of one’s 
own. Leaping in with “a package of care” conjures up 
an image of instrumental and mechanistic concern, 
and in this image there is little room left for the 
person to constitute a place that is his or hers. (2) The 
giving of “a package of care” with provisos attached 
is associated with a contractual arrangement between 
two independent and self sufficient entities. It is not a 
relationship associated with care and concern for 
another human being. (3) The institutionalized mode 
of care jettisons hope because hope is “just wishing”. 
But when hope becomes “just wishing”, it loses its 
courage to venture forth and find different ways of 
being. (4) Living well and living without symptoms 
are not synonymous; one can live well and have 
symptoms at the same time, according to Mason 
Durie (in Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). It is worth 
noting that the tradition of depth psychology also 
argues that the possibility of living well becomes a 
human reality only in the presence of symptoms. 
When institutions set out to care in this way – to give 
a package of care that will get a person into a place 
where they can function at the highest level and have 
a better quality of life – it compounds our 
misunderstanding of the human condition and 
achieves the opposite of its intent: humans become 
entities with properties and functions with buttons 
that can be pushed to check if they are symptom free 
and ready for a good life. The question for research in 
practice now is how to return to what is intended, at a 
fundamental level, by care, since our understanding of 
it appears to have strayed from its origins. 
 
A further consequence associated with the positivist 
model of psychology in New Zealand, according to 
Evans and Fitzgerald (2007), is that it has not 
benefited Maori. These indigenous peoples of New 
Zealand are over-represented in acute mental 
disorders, and this is reflected in the alarming rise in 
suicide and attempted suicide among their youth 
(Durie, 1999). Durie is concerned about the way in 
which behavioural and psychological phenomena are 
conceptualized, stating that the medicalisation and 
classification of disorders according to DSM IV 
diagnostic categories is not capable of measuring the 
degree to which cultural and spiritual factors are 
associated with the problem. Furthermore, a DSM IV 
diagnosis conjures up the expectation that ‘treatment’ 
is possible and that a diagnosis will somehow lead to 
a resolution. Unfortunately this ‘value-free’ science of 
health and wellness, where diagnoses lead to 
packages of evidence-based treatment protocols, 
refuses to take into account the value-laden factors of 
culture and spirituality that are associated with Maori 
health and wellness. According to Durie (1999), it is 
precisely this value-free intent of science, which 
supposedly ensures objectivity, that discredits 
treatment approaches which make greater sense in 
cultural terms. 
  
Guinon (2006) is of the view that there are 
substantive and unavoidable moral questions that 
form part of any attempt to understand human beings 
in psychological practice. Guinon asserts that 
therapists are asked to serve as moral authorities to 
fill the vacuum left by the rise of modern 
technological civilization. Before our modern 
industrial-technological age, people experienced the 
meaning of their lives in daily discourse with rituals, 
practices and institutions that hold whole 
communities together at a religious, cultural, social 
and occupational level. This view resonates with the 
Maori concept of wellness and the subsequent 
splintering of their worldview by a more dominant 
materialistic-technological concept of life and living. 
The industrial-technological revolution cut the 
individual adrift from this context, leaving lone 
individuals no longer sustained by the cultural 
resources of their ancestors. This is the root of our 
psychological problems in modern times, says Guinon 
(2006). The questions of how to live and what to do 
have become problematic and central to the issues 
frequently dealt with in therapy. How to live one’s 
life and how to be at home in the world are clearly 
moral questions in the broader sense, says Guinon 
(2006), and as such are not completely addressed by 
finding solutions to the common everyday morality of 
right and acceptable actions and conduct. 
 
Dasein is thrown into a cultural-historical context 
with values and morals and the task to construct an 
existence that is mostly its own without discarding or 
rejecting this fate. This implies judgments and 
decisions about morals and values which cannot be 
avoided in the process of self-understanding. 
Authenticity involves encountering one’s possibilities 
as drawn from the wellspring of heritage, and living 
one’s life as part of the destiny of one’s historical 
community, says Heidegger (Guinon, 2006). This 
requires one to make decisions about matters of value, 
drawing on the ‘heroes’ and ‘destiny’ of the 
community of mankind, the morals, norms and values 
of the wider community as a whole. Therapy must 
therefore involve moral reflection if Heidegger’s 
concept of authenticity is correctly understood, says 
Guinon (2006). Modern therapy and its assumptions 
makes it difficult to grasp the moral dimensions of 
being human and risks perpetuating the problem in 
the cure. “Heidegger’s conception of authenticity, in 
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contrast, can help us make sense of the moral 
dimensions of therapeutic practice not fully accounted 
for in most forms of theorizing” (Guinon, 2006, p. 
290).  
 
In considering that Dasein is thrown into a cultural-
historical context with values and morals and the task 
to construct an existence that is mostly its own 
without discarding or rejecting this fate, one can see 
how the positivist model of psychology in New 
Zealand has not benefited Maori. A ‘value free’ 
psychology practice will ignore precisely that which 
is so important for Maori: knowing what to do and 
knowing how to live by drawing upon exemplars of 
history and culture. Maori value their ancestry, their 
physical place in the world, and their cultural stories, 
rites and rituals. They are of the view that these 
values define who they collectively are and who they 
collectively have become. The wider historical 
context of the Maori, with its morals and values, 
shapes and guides their sense of wellbeing. They 
experience dis-ease and feel out of kilter when they 
are estranged from this way of knowing and 
understanding, and a ‘value free’ attitude in treatment 
compounds the problem. Westerners suffer from the 
same dis-ease, but have forgotten that they do, and 
science, to some considerable extent, has helped them 
along this way. 
 
Guinon (2006) asserts that therapists may feel poorly 
equipped for the task of serving as moral authorities 
to fill the vacuum left by the rise of modern 
technological civilization. As elsewhere, psychology 
in practice in New Zealand thinks of itself as an 
‘applied behavioural science’ and endeavours to be 
value-free and objective, trusting as truth only what 
can be observed and explained by cause and effect 
reasoning. How to live and what to do at an 
ontological level – and the moral dilemmas inherent – 
are consequently not attended to in therapy. To be 
‘value free’ is, in itself, a value-laden attitude. There 
can be no such thing as being value free in the true 
sense of the word. Three assumptions drawn from 
naturalism underlie the conception of humans found 
in most psychotherapy theories, says Guinon. These 
assumptions conceal more than they reveal. Firstly, 
humans are objectified like other physical objects. 
The traditional image of reality as a value-laden, 
meaningful cosmos has been replaced by aggregates 
of objects in causal interactions. Secondly, humans as 
agents of action are now perceived through the lens of 
instrumental reason and technological control. An 
agency of action now implies the capacity for 
strategic calculations, means-ends procedures and 
end-product planning. I believe that the preceding 
example of Marie illustrates this and the following 
argument very well. With the guidance of experts we 
can now re-engineer our own lives according to a 
rational blueprint of the kind so evident in the 
psychotherapeutic vocabulary of ‘strengthening the 
ego’, ‘restructuring cognitive strategies’, ‘learning 
coping skills’ and ‘managing stress’, says Guinon. 
The aim of psychotherapy, with this calculative-
instrumentalists approach, is levelled down to what is 
realistic and consistent, or, stated differently, 
pragmatic and evidence-based. With these aims, the 
modern naturalistic outlook attempts to free itself 
from a two-tiered view of life: ‘merely living’ (just 
functioning and satisfying needs) and ‘better living’ 
(a form of existence when the proper aims of life are 
achieved or aspired to). Thirdly, there is what Guinon 
refers to as the “ontological individualism” of 
modernity. This is when human reality is viewed as 
self-encapsulated individuals who interact in social 
systems competing for resources towards self-
actualization. Relationships become contractual 
agreements that are sustained as long as the other 
promotes and makes these resources accessible. Our 
arrangement will be maintained as long as I ‘continue 
to grow’ or ‘still feel good about myself’. 
 
Guinon suggests that Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity has a great deal to offer psychotherapy. It 
points towards a way in which therapists can equip 
themselves to accompany those struggling with the 
moral issues that constitute the good life and being at 
home in the world. Inauthenticity is characterized by 
falling and forgetting. Dasein falls into the busyness 
of everyday affairs and becomes ensnared in these 
concerns, going along with the taken-for-granted 
practices of everydayness. Dasein forgets itself in the 
process, preoccupying itself and becoming self 
absorbed with checking its performance against 
public criteria. This first order of forgetting is 
compounded when Dasein preoccupies itself with 
concerns that are not generally at stake: the call of 
conscience and the task of defining an existence that 
is mostly its own. Our modern techno-scientific 
milieu has fragmented Dasein’s everyday existence 
into means-ends strategies governed by public 
attitudes of what constitutes success, acceptability and 
appropriateness; each of these is shot through with 
conformism and aggregates. The highs and lows of 
human existence are levelled out in an average ‘they’ 
where its constituent parts are no longer able to 
differentiate themselves. This inauthentic form of life 
is the perfect breeding ground for the kinds of 
demoralizing self disorders found among current 
candidates for psychotherapy, says Guinon. 
 
According to Evans and Fitzgerald (2007), there 
appears to be a shift in the social sciences in New 
Zealand, with greater emphasis placed on more 
subjective and qualitative models of ‘knowing’, in 
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recognition that scientific knowledge is not 
indisputable and absolutely certain knowledge. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods of understanding 
are not similar, and the fact that both have strengths 
and limitations suggests that using both, rather than 
one or the other, would best increase understanding. 
“This ecumenical perspective is not, however, 
universally shared in New Zealand, or 
internationally” (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 295). 
One such qualitative method of knowing is that 
proposed by Heidegger in his phenomenological 
analysis of Dasein. To “exist as Dasein means to hold 
open a domain through its capacity to receive-
perceive the significance of the things that are given 
to it [Dasein] and that addresses it [Dasein] by virtue 
of its own ‘clearing’” (Heidegger, 1959-69/2001, p. 
4). Heidegger is emphatic that human existence 
cannot be objectified, because the significance of 
things received-perceived is such by virtue of human 
existence itself. There is no subject to be separated 
from an object. The existence of both is inter-
dependent. Without one there is no other, and in 
therapy there can thus not be an object (therapist) and 
a subject (patient), nor an ‘inside’ subject, nor 
experiences that can be measured or encapsulated by 
theoretical representations, without forgetting that the 
world of a therapeutic encounter is the ‘clearing’ 
where the significance of what is received-perceived 
is laid bare for the first time by Being-with one 
another. It is for this reason that aggregating methods 
and techniques of therapy are unsuited for the purpose 
of encountering another person in need of help, 
because ‘method and technique’ are born in each 
unique ‘clearing’ of Being-with. A therapy designed 
to treat suicidality, for instance, with an evidence-
based method because it correlates with a 
predetermined factor, violates a basic structure of 
human existence. What matters only arrives in the 
space created by two people at the time of encounter; 
it is the origin of what is significant and consequently 
determines what occurs in treatment. It is also the 
space where research questions that really matter 
become present, as I attempted to illustrate with the 
example of Marie. 
 
Science and indigenous knowledge are built on 
distinctive philosophies, methodologies and criteria. 
Durie (2004) uses examples to illustrate how these 
differences are used in a constructive manner towards 
a more comprehensive understanding of health and 
illness. Durie is thus one of those New Zealanders 
who adopts a more ecumenical perspective towards 
understanding health and illness and resists the 
temptation to be drawn into debate where differences 
are used to divide. This attitude is in keeping with 
most indigenous knowledge, and the Maori in 
particular, which “places a greater emphasis on the 
construction of models where multiple strands can be 
accommodated to make up an interacting whole” 
(Durie, 2004, p. 1140). This inductive form of 
reasoning contrasts with the reductive reason of 
science. 
 
Indigenous knowledge is distinctive in its 
conceptualization of ‘world’. Indigenous people have 
a tradition of unity with the environment, and this 
tradition is reflected in song, custom, subsistence, 
approaches to healing, birthing, and the rituals 
associated with death. Indigeneity represents a state 
of fusion between indigenous peoples and their 
accustomed environments. “‘People are the land and 
the land is the people.’ … ‘We are the river, the river 
is us’” (Durie, 2004, p. 1139). Maori’s concept of the 
world is something more than a scientifically 
observable structure; it is not something that can be 
reduced into smaller and smaller components in a 
standard scientific method. This worldview resonates 
with that of Heidegger (1927/1962). Whether Dasein 
exists authentically or inauthentically, the character of 
this existence must be understood a priori as 
grounded in a state of Being that Heidegger refers to 
as Being-in-the-world. This compound expression 
indicates a unitary phenomenon. We are inclined, 
says Heidegger, to think of being-in as being in 
something. This kind of being is a spatial relationship 
between things – like water in a glass – but this is not 
the being-in he is referring to. He is referring to 
Being-in as an existential structure and as such as 
belonging only to Dasein (Cavalier, 2006). Dasein is 
in the world, active and dwelling among entities of 
the world. This implies that Dasein is involved with 
concern, is touched and affected in this related 
existence. Human existence is grounded in our always 
already finding ourselves in the world. Traditional 
thought posits a ‘mind’ which exists without a world. 
The mind can have thoughts and feelings regardless 
of the world – I think therefore I am. Whilst this is 
one mode of Being (as a categorical structure of 
existence), it is not the Being of Dasein. What does 
‘world’ mean in the expression Being-in-the-world? 
World is something Dasein has. Without Dasein there 
will be no world (Waters, 2005). It is an existential 
structure bound together with Dasein and represents 
the undifferentiated surroundings of Dasein. If one 
“fails to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein, 
the phenomenon of worldhood likewise gets passed 
over” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 93). Our everyday 
understanding of things of our world frequently 
conceals the true functioning of nature. The rules of 
nature were scientifically established only once 
scientists undertook to disregard the world as it makes 
sense to us, as it appears in our everyday dealings 
with things. For example, the everyday understanding 
of the sun rising in the East and setting in the West is 
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proven false by science. There is no rising or setting 
of the sun – the earth revolves around the sun. For 
science the world is ‘Nature’, but this is not the world 
of Dasein (Heidegger, 1927/1962). The danger, says 
Wrathall (2005), is that our reverence for physical 
science makes us dismiss as unreal anything that 
cannot be proven by scientific method, and we then 
run the risk of overlooking the world. This, in turn, 
makes it impossible to understand ourselves. Durie 
(2004) echoes this when he asserts that the worldview 
of indigenous people has been seriously fractured by 
the now dominant western scientific view of ‘world’ 
and is closely linked to a host of health problems that 
beset indigenous peoples. Our world conceived of as 
a revolving planet says very little about the nature of 
the world of human existence. But, with a sun rising 
and setting, we can get closer to an understanding of 
human existence through the activities and objectives 
dictated by this everyday understanding of our world. 
“Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible 
entities within-the-world … as a categorical aggregate 
of structures of Being … (it) can never make 
worldhood intelligible” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 
94).  
 
Heidegger’s conception of the ‘fourfold’ clarifies his 
latter thoughts on the being that is human and 
‘world’, according to Young (2006), and in my view 
resonates with Maori’s worldview of being at one 
with their accustomed environment where the “people 
are the land and the land is the people”. What does it 
mean to be at one with your accustomed 
environment? It is where you dwell with familiarity, 
where you feel at home. It is on the earth and under 
the sky you are accustomed to, alongside mortals and 
before gods you are familiar with (Young, 2006). In 
this dwelling, space divine and human destinies are in 
dialogue. In Young’s view, the divinities are more or 
less mythological figures preserved in the collective 
memory of a culture and represent ‘life’ models. They 
are ageless exemplars of a virtuous and good life, a 
possible destiny for the mortals that we are. Young 
also argues that the fourfold in which you dwell is a 
local fourfold. It is the where I am familiar with and 
beyond which things are foreign to me. The land of 
my fathers, the soil which bore my crops and the sky 
which governs the seasons is a very specific location. 
Beyond that, the fourfold of others and the fourfold of 
the universe becomes foreign. The fourfold is one. 
Each aspect mirrors the other and forms a unity. For 
example, one’s mortality is reflected in the divine, 
and the divine is reflected in the earthly mortal. The 
being that I am, the existence of my being, is a 
reflection of the interaction of the elements of this 
fourfold, of my place where I dwell. It then follows 
why the fourfold of another causes one to feel out of 
kilter; for example, the new immigrant’s initial sense 
of ‘not being at home’ in the new country. The inter-
connectivity of earth, sky, mortals and gods opens up 
the horizon of possibilities that differ from culture to 
culture. It identifies things, rituals and a life of 
significance that differ from people to people. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological critique aims to get to 
these “moments of sense” within the “factical life-
experience” of the person in his or her familiar 
dwelling place. It is a method which attempts to 
explicate that which makes sense and is meaningful 
within a cultural context, without attempting to 
recontextualize what is revealed into a new projection 
that is foreign. The people of the land and the land of 
the people – their sky and their gods – are appreciated 
as a unity in a hermeneutic phenomenological mode 
of understanding.  
 
Indigenous knowledge is also distinctive in its 
conceptualization of ‘time’. Durie (2004, p. 1139) 
makes reference to indigenous people’s definition of 
health: health and survival constitute a “collective and 
an intergenerational continuum encompassing a 
holistic perspective incorporating four distinct shared 
dimensions of life”. These dimensions are the 
spiritual, the intellectual, the physical and the 
emotional. Linking these four fundamental 
dimensions, health and survival are manifested on 
multiple levels where the past, present and future 
coexist simultaneously. This view of ‘time’ resonates 
with that of Heidegger (1959-69/2001). Without the 
unfolding essence of being human, there will be no 
time. Time and being human belong together. We talk 
about time as something sensed, being conscious of 
and experienced. The clock says it is ten o’clock 
‘now’, but we do not need a clock to tell us when now 
is. We already have a now, without a clock. In two 
hours it will be twelve o’clock, but we already have a 
‘then’ even before it is measured by the clock. 
Measured time does not tell us about our relationship 
with time. It does not tell us what time is. Measured 
time does not determine time. We already have a 
today, yesterday and a tomorrow. Time is always 
holding sway over us, says Heidegger (1927/1962). 
 
The phenomenon of the givenness of time, what it in 
itself is, can be understood in our everyday 
relationship to time. Our relationship to time is 
characterized by significance, says Heidegger. The 
significance is that it is always for something. This 
characteristic of significance is also essential to time 
itself. Significance belongs to time itself and not to a 
subject’s intention. It has nothing to do with 
intentionality. Intentionality adds something to time 
whereby it is subsequently related to something else. 
‘I have time to talk to you’; the intention to talk does 
not illuminate time itself. Another characteristic of 
time is its datability. Datability does not mean a date 
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on the calendar. The ‘now’ of time is not datable in 
the sense of a calendar date, but refers to a certain 
temporal extendedness (past, present, future). “The 
disturbed relationship to time accompanying some 
forms of mental illness can only be understood from 
the human background of original, significant, and 
datable time” (Heidegger, 1959-69/2001, p. 44). 
Phenomenological investigations have shown that the 
most disturbing experience of time in, for instance, 
depressive conditions is an arrest of time – a flowing 
back of the stream of time (Ellenberger, 1958). 
 
Being-in-time refers to an existence characterized by 
continuity, significance and datability. Time in this 
compound expression refers to continuity. The 
authentic character of time (our relationship with 
‘having time’) is expecting, making present and 
retaining. It is in this fluid relationship that we 
understand ourselves by way of interpreting what we 
receive and perceive. This relationship is definitive of 
an existence. Our relationship to time sustains our 
being in the world. What we do with time joins past, 
present and future. It temporalizes our existence 
(Heidegger, 1959-69/2001). How we find ourselves is 
always at the junctions of past, present and future. It 
is fluid and cannot be captured and fixed in calibrated 
‘now’ moments. 
 
The aforementioned philosophical distinctions lead to 
methods of research that embrace an inductive way of 
knowing. This method of knowing is central to 
qualitative methods of research where “understanding 
comes not so much from an appreciation of 
component parts as from synthesis into a wider 
context” (Durie, 2004, p. 1140). This method cannot 
be verified by scientific criteria, nor does it wish to 
be. This does not make it a less valid way of knowing, 
but, instead, presents arguments which may lead to a 
more comprehensive understanding of health and 
illness.  
 
Maori have a distinct way of conceptualizing illness 
and wellbeing. Durie (2004) asserts that the Western 
scientific model of disease focuses on signs and 
symptoms of a disorder rather than the individual’s 
capacity to function in a dignified and meaningful 
manner. For Maori, the meaning of wellness does not 
mean the removal of symptoms; being well means 
living a meaningful life with or without symptoms. 
This view accords with Heidegger’s (1959-69/2001) 
concept of privation. Privation implies that the 
essential belonging to something is lacking. Privation 
is the negation of a phenomenon. We are tempted to 
define something by what it is not. Illness is a 
phenomenon of privation. Illness is not in need of 
health, but rather health is in need of something. 
Being dead refers to what can die, and only what lives 
can die. Thus, being ill or dying is a form of living. 
Suicidality, for instance, does not mean that there is 
no longer hope, but rather that hope has been 
deprived of what it is. In privation, hope no longer is 
– or seems to no longer be – yet always is. Privation 
is an ontological phenomenon, in that it refers to a 
possibility of being. The nature of a privation cannot 
be understood until that which it is a privation of is 
understood. Suicide, or illness, both of which are 
privations, cannot be understood unless the existence 
of that which suicide or illness is a privation of is 
understood. The being that exists is more than the 
privations of that existence.  
 
The correspondence between Heidegger’s philosophy 
and indigenous views of wellbeing shows that what is 
unique to Maori and other indigenous people’s way of 
knowing also resonates with a rich Eurocentric 
philosophic tradition which aims to explore and 
understand the meaning of being human in one’s 
experience in a given cultural and historical context. I 
want to suggest that living a meaningful life and 
living well be understood as our self-understanding 
projected towards the ideal of an authentic existence. 
What is authenticity? Crowe (2006) argues that 
Heidegger's philosophy is motivated by the ideal of 
an authentic existence and that this ideal is difficult to 
realize, due mainly to tradition. In tradition, the 
individual encounters a life that is already made 
meaningful; it has already been interpreted and given 
expression in discourse prior to the arrival of the 
individual. It is Crowe's view that the individual finds 
it easier to join in this discourse and to pass off ideas 
and interpretations of phenomena as self-evident, as 
the collective is prone to do. It is easier to allow one’s 
identity be shaped alongside this reality of the ‘one’ 
because the alternative is a daunting and anxiety-
provoking quest. The quest is to reinterpret that which 
is apparently so self-evident, but it is exactly through 
this task that a person begins to create a more 
authentic existence. Hermeneutic phenomenology is a 
method oriented towards the ideal of authenticity. The 
starting point is the re-interpretation of that which has 
become so self-evident by rediscovering the original 
meaning of phenomena in the context of lived 
experience. 
 
Whilst Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is 
supposed to point to a way of life that is higher than 
that of average everydayness, it does not imply a 
detachment of Dasein from its world, and nor is it 
envisioned as a replacement for it. Dasein’s history is 
the wellspring from which possibilities are drawn and 
presents Dasein with exemplars to guide it in 
constituting a world that is mostly its own. The 
resolve to own and direct one’s existence comes 
about when Dasein faces its own death and 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 2   September 2008  Page 9 of 11 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
recognizes its finitude. It is this anxious experience of 
an existential given which spurs a more authentic 
attunement and understanding. It usually occurs in 
those moments when Dasein realizes that, from the 
outset, its possible future always runs ahead into the 
past; Dasein hears the call of conscience inviting it to 
reinterpret what is understood of its existence. 
 
Heidegger’s description of authenticity does point to 
certain character ideals and moral commitments. An 
authentic focus requires traits such as resolve, 
steadiness, courage and honest recognition of one’s 
finitude. We are what we do, the structure of our lives 
is determined by our actions, and we are ultimately 
answerable. We cannot avoid this. The 
aforementioned matters are steeped in values and 
morals woven into the fabric of life and living. 
Resolve, steadiness, courage and so forth are matters 
of value. Moral reflection plays a crucial role in our 




If the aim is to better integrate psychology research 
and practice in New Zealand, the psychology 
profession needs to reconsider how it goes about 
gaining knowledge and putting it into practice in a 
manner that says more than a ‘value-free’ DSM IV 
diagnosis and the associated manuals of treatment. 
This method and practice is truncated in eschewing 
the value-laden meaning of culture and history from 
which a person attempts to construct a life that is also 
his or her own. It is at this complex juncture where a 
sense of wellbeing finds its origins, and not in a 
particular thought or specific behaviour. It is said that 
there is a growing recognition of this in New Zealand 
psychology. If this is the case, then there will also be 
a growing realization that the positivist model in 
psychology is based on a philosophy which is not 
commensurate with its intent in practice for all New 
Zealanders and Maori in particular. A Heideggerian 
philosophy in practice recognizes that humans are not 
objects like other physical objects in the world, but 
that world exists by virtue of being human. It 
recognizes that humans do not ‘merely live’ by 
acquiring practical and expedient living skills in order 
to cope and conform, but that human beings also 
strive for a better and meaningful life. It recognizes 
that we are always first with-others before we are 
encapsulated egos competing and cooperating in 
contractual relationships for resources towards self-
actualization and better lifestyle options. 
The philosophy supporting indigenous knowledge in 
New Zealand appears to find an echo in Heidegger’s 
philosophy. Both are philosophical traditions in which 
the meaning of world, time, illness and well-being is 
more comprehensively understood. They are 
philosophical traditions that lend themselves to 
qualitative methods of knowing such as 
phenomenology. Heidegger’s analysis of Being is a 
philosophical perspective which offers an orientation 
for research in New Zealand psychology in which 
practitioners are not ‘consumers’ but research 
practitioners. They are active and thinking agents who 
identify research questions in practice; practitioners 
who re-search phenomena for what they may reveal 
during consultation. Practitioners in a phenomeno-
logical research orientated discipline trust their eyes 
and ears. They really believe in what they do and they 
do what they believe with conviction. People in need 
of help can sense this attitude. It is the essence of 
therapy itself. Phenomenologically oriented therapists 
recognize that technique and models of treatment fail 
to make the human world intelligible. They are 
interested in how the pre-scientific sun rises and sets 
for the person they face in consultation.  
 
This kind of research orientation recognizes that, in 
its practice, the questions of how to live and what to 
do cannot be contemplated without considering the 
value-laden context of human life. It will develop 
treatments that make greater sense in cultural and 
human terms. It presents an ecumenical perspective 
which places “greater emphasis in the construction of 
models where multiple strands can be accommodated 
to make up an interacting whole” (Durie, 2004, p. 
1140). This kind of research orientation recognizes 
that practitioners are not passive consumers of 
science, but that they actively and spontaneously 
participate with those they encounter in practice, 
wrestling with the moral dimensions of living well 
and meaningfully.  
 
By way of argument and example, I have suggested 
here that a hermeneutic phenomenological approach 
is one way in which to explore and understand what 
Maori may experience in terms of their need to live 
well and meaningfully when they consult mental 
health services about their concerns. It is a method 
that promises a more meaningful interface between 
psychological research and practice in New Zealand. 
It takes account of the cultural and spiritual factors 
which inform indigenous views of wellbeing and 
living. It encourages practitioners to take note of 
‘moments of sense’ in our everyday lives, moments 
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